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ABSTRACT
During the last two decades, many Latin American countries engaged in disinflation programs
based on both exchange rate management and fiscal reforms. However, in most instances, part of the
fiscal reform was delayed or not implemented completely, so the fiscal deficit increased and the program
had to be abandoned. The aftermath of these programs is not encouraging, since most of these policies
turned out to be failures, lowering reserves and causing higher inflation rates. Given this record, it is
worth asking why governments start a disinflation program even though the fiscal equilibrium is not
guaranteed. In this paper we show that, if the reform process is uncertain and inflation has welfare costs,
the optimal exchange rate policy implies the initiation of a disinflation program at the announcement of
the fiscal reform. Additionally, we show that even if there exists a possibility of a balance of payments
crisis, it is still optimal to initiate a disinflation program. This means that, in this set up, avoiding the crisis
with probability one is suboptimal. Finally, we show that it is optimal to engage in a sequence of
stabilization programs until one of them is successful.
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During the last two decades, many Latin American countries engaged in disinﬂation programs based on
both exchange rate management and ﬁscal reforms. However, in most instances, part of the ﬁscal reform
was delayed or not implemented completely, so the ﬁscal deﬁcit increased and the program had to be
abandoned. The aftermath of these programs is not encouraging:since most of these policies turned out to
be failures, lowering reserves and causing higher inﬂation rates. Given this record, it is worth asking why
governments start a disinﬂation program even though the ﬁscal equilibrium is not guaranteed. A more
sensible strategy would be to stabilize the ﬁscal accounts ﬁrst, and then reduce inﬂation.
The literature has explained this behavior based on four alternative theories:the Olivera-Tanzi eﬀect,
optimal tax composition, exchange rate management as a disciplinary device, and political economy issues.
First, if the economy is working in the wrong side of the Laﬀer curve, there exists another equilibrium
with lower inﬂation. The idea is that the lag that exists between the realization of income and the time
income tax is paid reduces real revenue. A stabilization moves the economy to the left hand side of the
Laﬀer curve and no ﬁscal eﬀort is required. This is the Olivera-Tanzi eﬀect (see Olivera (1967) and Tanzi
(1978)). Second, the disinﬂation program might be the result of an optimal tax choice problem. For
example, consider an economy that has a high inﬂation tax and a low income tax. Moving toward the
optimal tax portfolio implies a reduction in inﬂation and an increase in income tax. This kind of tax
r e c o m p o s i t i o na r ec o m m o ni nt h eL a t i nA m e r i c a ne x p e r i e n c e ,a n da r ea ni m p o r t a n tc o m p o n e n to ft h e i r
reform processes. Third, the disinﬂation program can be thought as a commitment or disciplinary device to
encourage ﬁscal responsibility. If there is a conﬂict between the central bank and the government, and the
central bank is the stronger one, then the monetary authority initiates a managed exchange rate to force
the ﬁscal authority to reduce expenditure.1 Fourth, there are political economy models that concentrates
on the choice of the exchange rate regime. For example, Tornell and Velasco (1995) analyze a political
economy model that explains when a ﬁxed exchange rate is more likely to be adopted.
These theories capture important aspects of the disinﬂation programs in Latin America. They fail,
however, to explain several of the issues in those processes. The ﬁrst two theories cannot justify why
disinﬂation programs usually end with a balance of payments crisis. Both predict that no need for extra
ﬁnancing is required during the disinﬂation. The third explanation does not seem to capture the institu-
tional arrangements that prevail in Latin America; central bank independence is a relatively new concept
for the continent, and, in general, we observe that the monetary authority abandons the policy, and not the
converse. Finally, the fourth hypothesis depends on political economy institutions that are not necessarily
1The European disinﬂation experiences of the 80’s can be classiﬁed as examples of the use of monetary policy as a com-
mitment device.
2common across the region. These are undoubtedly important components of the story, however, here we
abstract from them and emphasize an alternative explanation.
In this paper2, we present a simple model that accounts for the behavior of the government based
on three assumptions:the process of reform is uncertain, inﬂation has welfare costs, and disinﬂations
are costly. The model has three main implications:First, the optimal exchange rate policy implies the
initiation of a disinﬂation program at the announcement of a ﬁscal reform. Second, even if there exists a
possibility of a balance of payments crisis, it is still optimal to initiate the disinﬂation program. Third,
it is optimal to engage in a sequence of stabilization programs until one of them is successful, or until a
b a l a n c eo fp a y m e n t sc r i s i so c c u r s 3.
The intuition is that the announcement of a ﬁscal reform conveys good news in the future in the form of
lower expected ﬁscal deﬁcits. Seigniorage has welfare costs, therefore it is optimal for the Central Bank, to
smooth the inﬂationary tax. Hence, a disinﬂation program is initiated at the announcement of the reform
and it is ﬁnanced with reserves. If the reform never takes place and the disinﬂation program has to be
abandoned, the ex-post inﬂation rate is higher than the one that existed before the program was initiated;
it looks as if the government made a mistake when they implemented the stabilization program in the ﬁrst
place.4
The paper is organized as follows:In section two, we summarize some of the Latin American stabi-
lization experiences. In section three, we present the basic setup. In section four, we solve the model
when there is no constraint on the level of reserves and prove that the optimal policy indeed implies the
initiation of a disinﬂation program at the announcement of a ﬁscal reform. In section ﬁve, we extend the
model to include the possibility of a balance of payments crisis. We show that even though there exists
the possibility of a balance of payments crisis, still it is optimal to initiate the disinﬂation. In section six,
we allow the government to re-initiate a new ﬁscal reform after the previous one had failed. The model
implies a sequence of stabilization programs, each one leading to a higher inﬂation rate. Section seven
concludes and oﬀers recommendations for future research.
2This paper is closely related to the literature studying disinﬂation programs under exchange rate managements. See Calvo
(1986, 1987) and Calvo & Drazen (1995). See also Rodriguez (1982) and Calvo & Vegh (1993) for the boom-recesion cycle,
and Calvo & Vegh (1993), Velasco (1993), Agenor & Montiel (1996) for the interest rates movements.
3It is important to point out that here we are concerned with the timing between the disinﬂation and the ﬁscal reform. As
we discuss below, the model only captures a small part of the disinﬂation (around 25%). In an earlier version of the paper,
the model included sticky prices and it was able to account for a sizeable fraction of the exchange rate peg.
4The paper is closely related to Calvo & Drazen (1995). They also study the impact of uncertain policies on the path of
the economy. In their case, they concentrate on the existence of market imperfections and its interaction with the uncertain
duration of the policies.
32. Latin American Experiences.
In this section we study some Latin American stabilization programs. We are interested in characterizing
the typical stabilization experience; both from the ﬁscal and the inﬂation point of view. Thus, this is
suggestive evidence of the patterns we are interested in explaining later in the paper.
In tables 2.1 and 2.2, we classify the stabilization programs for eight countries in the last 30 years,
according to two criteria (Following Tornell & Velasco (1995):whether it was successful or not in per-
manently reducing inﬂation, and whether the ﬁscal deﬁcit was reduced before, during or never after the
program was initiated. This list is not exhaustive, although suggestive. We deﬁne that an stabilization
is unsuccessful when inﬂation increases above the initial level or when another stabilization program is
initiated. Second, we decide that there was a ﬁscal eﬀort if the ﬁscal deﬁcit changed by more than ﬁve
percent of GDP or there is a ﬁscal surplus.5
Before During Never
Successful Chile 78 Argentina 91
Bolivia 85
Peru 90
Not Successful Mexico 87 Argentina 79 Brazil 86
Uruguay 79 Argentina 85 Venezuela 89




Table 2.1:Latin American Stabilizations:When expenditure was Reduced?
Two main points can be extracted from these tables:First, notice that there are few successful cases.
Second, notice that there are few cases where the ﬁscal deﬁcit was reduced before the stabilization program.
More importantly, these two cases (Chile 78 and Uruguay 79) were preceded by another stabilization
program (Chile 75 and Uruguay 74). Note that not all unsuccessful programs were abandoned because a
ﬁscal disequilibrium occurred. For example, in Chile 78 the program was abandoned because inﬂation was
too inertial and the program was ineﬀective in reducing inﬂation, and not because there was an increase
in the ﬁscal deﬁcit.
The typical Latin American country, then, starts a disinﬂation program when there is a problem of
high inﬂation and ﬁscal deﬁcit. To take care of the inﬂation problem a nominal anchor is implemented,
while to take care of the ﬁscal problem, a ﬁscal reform is initiated. However, the ﬁscal reform takes time
and the deﬁcit or the expenditure are not reduced at the speed the government thought. In the end, most
5In other words, in Bolivia (1985) the ﬁscal deﬁcit was reduced from 30 percent of GDP to 5 percent. Even though the
country still had a considerably large ﬁscal deﬁcit we assume that enough eﬀorts were made. On the other hand, if the ﬁscal
deﬁcit decreases from 6 percent to 5 percent we decide that no eﬀort was made.
4Before During Never
Successful Chile 78 Argentina 91
Bolivia 85
Peru 90
Not Successful Uruguay 79 Brazil 90 Argentina 79
Chile 75 Argentina 85





Table 2.2:Latin American Stabilizations:When the ﬁscal deﬁcit was reduced?
of the time the monetary policy is abandoned and the economy returns to a higher level of inﬂation. In
this situation, a new stabilization program is announced and the cycle starts all over again. The model
presented in this paper formalizes this intuition.
3. Basic Model.
As was mentioned before, the three main ingredients of the model are the following:the reform process
is uncertain, inﬂation has welfare costs, and a disinﬂation program is costly. Some coments about each of
t h e s ec o m p o n e n t sh a v et ob em a d e .
We are interested in the permanent ﬁscal reforms such as privatization, social security reforms, labor
market liberalization, reduction in the size of the government, new tax laws, etc. In general, these reforms
imply a permanent change in the ﬁscal deﬁcit process that aﬀects consumer’s choices. However, they
require negotiations with congress, unions, and industries, and the experience of several Latin American
countries has shown that their implementation is diﬃcult, time-consuming, and sometimes unsuccessful.6
In practice, governments are able to reduce expenditure and ﬁscal deﬁcit in many diﬀerent ways. There
are short run measures that are relatively easy to implement, such as elimination of subsidies, reduction in
public investment, delay in the increase of public sector wages, etc. Some of these measures, however, are
not sustainable and in a model of perfect foresight agents, ineﬀective. In other words, the present value
of the deﬁcit does not change and therefore, there is no eﬀect on consumer’s decisions. In this paper, we
concentrate on the long run permanent measures.
In the model, we assume that inﬂation is the only available tax, and that it generates welfare costs.
First, the assumption that inﬂation is the only available tax is capturing the fact that in Latin America,
6Alesina and Drazen (1991) provide a theoretical explanation of why these negotiations might require time. Also, see
Alesina and Perotti (1996).
5seigniorage has been an important share of the government’s revenue, especially before the reform. More-
over, it also reﬂects that during the 70’s and 80’s inﬂation was used as the marginal instrument to raise
revenue; the tax system was rigid and the only two sources the government had to ﬁnance a shock were
reserves and seigniorage.7 The second assumption is that inﬂation has welfare costs. In the literature, there
are several papers that discuss the nature and measures of these costs.8 In this paper, we simplify and
capture them with a concave utility function and a cash in advance constraint. This particular formulation
has the advantage that it can be interpreted as a tax smoothing problem, where inﬂation is a distortionary
tax. Barro (1979) showed that when taxes are distortionary, the optimal policy is to spread the tax burden
across time: tax smoothing9. In our case, the tax smoothing result implies inﬂation smoothing. Note
that the smoothing motive justiﬁes the implementation of the disinﬂation program. In other words, the
announcement of the ﬁscal reform implies that future welfare costs might be smaller. If the cost function
is convex, then consumers want to transfer part of the future beneﬁts to today, which requires reducing
current inﬂation.10
Finally, a disinﬂation program is costly because it deprives the government of a source of revenue.
The loss in reserves today leads to a higher level of inﬂation in the future, as the government seeks to
recover revenue. This is the Sargent and Wallace (1980) eﬀect, which in our case, appears as a reduction
in reserves, rather than as an increase in debt.11
As it should be clear by now, in the model the tax smoothing motive drives the timing of the disinﬂation,
while the Sargent and Wallace eﬀect generates the costs of the program.
Two additional remarks:First, failed stabilization programs are far more costly than just the Sargent
and Wallace eﬀect. In practice, the failure to implement a disinﬂation program is costly, not only in loss of
reserves, but in several and probably more important ways, such as recessions, loss in credibility in future
programs, etc. These costs could be included in the model. However, it would complicate the analysis
7The assumption that inﬂation is the only tax eliminates issues of optimal composition of taxes, and the Olivera-Tanzi
eﬀect. In the literature on optimal inﬂation tax see Phelps (1973) for the ﬁrst contribution. Additionally, Fischer (1983)
studies optimal inﬂation tax in the context of diﬀerent exchange rate regimes, Vegh (1989a) studies it in the context of
currency substitution, and Aizenman (1987), De Gregorio (1993), and Vegh (1989b) study it in the context of diﬀerent degrees
of eﬃciency in the tax system. For the Olivera Tanzi eﬀect see the seminal contributions by Olivera (1967) and Tanzi (1978).
The exclusion of these issues simpliﬁes the analysis; however, it is important to mention that if those aspects are introduced
in the model, the results hold.
8Several authors had measured the welfare costs of inﬂation. The literature started with Bailey (1956), Fischer (1981) and
Lucas (1981) where they argue that the welfare cost of moderate inﬂations is low. Recent constributions include Colley and
Hansen (1989, 1991), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (1992), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu and Prescott (1991), and Jones and Manuelli (1993). In general, the
literature agrees on important welfare costs at high inﬂation rates, but moderate to small eﬀects are found at low inﬂation.
9See Barro (1988), Calvo and Guidotti (1992), Ball and Mankiw (1994), Mankiw (1984) and Saint-Paul (1994).
10It is important to mention that the assumption that the welfare costs are convex can be relaxed. It can be shown that if
the concavity of seignorage is larger than the concavity of the welfare costs of inﬂation, then the optimal strategy still is to
smooth inﬂation.
11See also Liviatan (1984, 1986) and van Wijnbergen (1988)
6without improving the intuition. Second, the amount of disinﬂation predicted by the model comes from the
tax smoothing motive, and therefore, is relatively small in comparison with the data. The Latin American
experience on average implies a reduction in the exchange rate depreciation from 200 percent to almost
zero. The tax smoothing (at best) would be able to account for one quarter of that. This caveat, however,
can be solved if sticky prices or inﬂation inertia (àl aCalvo) is introduced in the model.12 Moreover,
issues of credibility, transparency of policy, and or political economy will contribute to explain the size of
the disinﬂation. In this paper, however, we are more concerned with the timing of the disinﬂation, rather
than its magnitude. The inclusion of sticky prices (for example) complicates the analysis but does not
change the date at which the disinﬂation program is initiated. In that model, only the “intensity” of the
disinﬂation program is changed.
3.1. Environment and Consumers
Consider a small open economy where there is a single tradable good and where PPP holds. Assume there
is perfect capital mobility and zero foreign inﬂation. All bonds are indexed, thus the domestic nominal
inﬂation rate is equal to the rate of depreciation, and the domestic interest rate is equal to the depreciation
rate plus the foreign real interest rate (assumed to be constant).13 There are three agents:an inﬁnitely
lived representative consumer, the government and the central bank.
Consumers choose their consumption path and portfolio holdings taking as given the exchange rate

















where ct is consumption, y is output (assumed to be constant), at are the asset holdings denominated
in tradables, mt denotes money balances in terms of tradables, ρ is the discount rate (assumed to be
constant), and it is the nominal domestic interest rate. The ﬁrst equation is the consumer’s objective
function. The second one is the budget constraint in terms of tradables, where the interest rate has been
12See Agenor and Montiel (1996) for an open economy model with cash in advance contraints and sticky prices.
13We assume that there is no growth in the world economy and that it is in steady state, thus the international real interest
rate is equal to the discount rate.
7already substituted by the international interest rate. The third one is the cash in advance constraint.
And the fourth one is the transversality condition on consumer’s assets.
There are four technical assumptions used in the model that simplify the analysis. First, we assume
that consumers do not derive utility from government expenditure. Second, we assume that output is
exogenously given. Relaxing these two assumptions does not change the results. If output depends on
the level of expenditure or consumers derive utility from public expenditure, this makes the expenditure
reduction less desirable. However, if reducing expenditure is welfare improving, then there is a reduction
in tax requirements in the future and the results still hold.
Third, we adopt a cash in advance formulation. An equivalent formulation is one where money enters
in the utility function. The same general results hold with the exception that the path of money holdings
might be diﬀerent. Cash in advance assumes that money and consumption are complements, and money in
the utility function relaxes this assumption. We choose a cash in advance formulation because it captures
the distortionary inﬂation tax in a simpler way. See Appendix E for the solution of the money in the utility
case.
And fourth, we assume log utility. The choice of log utility simpliﬁes the consumer’s solution making
current consumption independent of the future interest rate path. A diﬀerent utility function implies
that current consumption is a function of the future path of interest rates. Thus, some intertemporal
substitution is made by the consumers at the announcement of the reform. However, full smoothing is
only achieved if there is tax smoothing (this result comes from Barro (1979)). So, still it is the case that
the optimal strategy involves inﬂation smoothing.










The government ﬁnances an exogenous expenditure on tradables by inﬂationary tax and interest earnings
on reserves. We assumed that the government expenditure has no impact on output or the consumer’s
utility; it is wasteful expenditure. At time zero, the government announces an uncertain ﬁscal reform, in
the sense that it is not sure when it can be implemented or if it will ever be. We assume that all agents
have the same prior about the probability of success of such reform.
8Assume that the expenditure’s process is described by,
gt =

    
    
gh t<τ
gh wp 1 − qt ≥ τ
gl wp q
(3.4)
where q, τ and gh >g l are exogenously given. Deﬁne the expenditure improvement as ∆g = gh−gl.D e ﬁ n e
the bad state of the world as the state in which expenditure is not reduced, and the good state of the world
as the state in which expenditure is permanently reduced.
There are three technical remarks about these stochastic process:First, the timing of the adjustment
is known, but not its outcome. In section 6, we show that the results still hold if this assumption is
relaxed. Second, the drift of the process is negative, thus there is a true process of reform in place. In the
appendix, a more general process is analyzed and the relative importance of the drift is studied. Third,
the expenditure process is exogenous. The question we are addressing is why countries peg their exchange
rates, conditional on having a ﬁscal reform in place. Thus, the exogeneity of the process can be interpreted
as the existence of conﬂicts between monetary and ﬁscal policy, and that the ﬁscal authority is the stronger
one. Hence, the expenditure process can be considered as exogenous by the central bank.
The government’s budget constraint is given by,
.
Bt = etgt − Ωt + itBt (3.5)
where Bt denotes the government debt held by the central bank and Ωt represents the central bank’s
proﬁts, discussed below. We assume that the government’s debt is in nominal terms but indexed. This
eliminates the incentives for discrete devaluations or surprise inﬂations to reduce its real value.
In the present model, the government has been oversimpliﬁed; it has no choices to make. It follows
a very simple rule. It maintains a high expenditure and at time τ,i fl u c k y ,i tc a nr e d u c ei t . I nf u r t h e r
research, the endogeneity of both the expenditure and the reform process should be introduced to study
the political economy aspects of stabilization programs.
3.3. Central Bank
The central bank decides the path of exchange rate depreciations that maximize consumer’s utility, taking
as given the government’s expenditure path and the consumer’s reaction function. This is a benevolent
C e n t r a lB a n ki nt h es e n s et h a ti t so bj e c t i v ef u n c t i o ni se x a c t l yt h es a m ea st h a to ft h ec o n s u m e r s .O b v i o u s l y
9diﬀerent results would be obtained if the Central Bank has a diﬀerent objective. However, in this paper
we want to analyze what is the optimal policy, from the consumer’s perspective, conditional on a ﬁscal
reform. As will become clear later, even in this restrictive environment we can justify the initiation of a
disinﬂation program even though the ﬁscal accounts are not yet in equilibrium.14 This is indeed the most
important contribution of this paper. The rest of the sections show how robust it is.
The central bank’s balance sheet and ﬂow proﬁts in nominal terms are given by:
Mt = etrt +Bt (3.6)
Ωt = itBt +( i∗
t +ˆ et)etrt
where Mt represents the nominal money holdings, rt is total reserves in foreign currency, i∗
t is the foreign
nominal interest rate, and ˆ et denotes the exchange rate depreciation. The ﬁrst equation is the central
bank’s balance sheet. The second equation is the central bank’s proﬁts which consist of nominal interest
earnings on government’s debt, foreign interest earnings on reserves, and the capital gains on reserves due
to a depreciation.
One implication of perfect capital mobility, the indexed government debt and the PPP assumptions
is that choosing the exchange rate depreciation is the same as choosing the inﬂation rate or the nominal
interest rate.15 Given this equivalence we assume that the central bank chooses the nominal interest rate.


















rt ≥ ¯ r
T h eﬁ r s tc o n s t r a i n ti st h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ sb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti nr e a lt e r m s .T h i si so b t a i n e db ys u b s t i t u t i n g
(3.6) into (3.5), and rewriting it in terms of tradables. Again, the real interest rate has been substituted out
by the international interest rate. The second constraint is the transversality condition on the government’s
debt. The third constraint is an international liquidity constraint reﬂected in a minimum level of reserves.
14This approach to optimal monetary policy is now standard in the literature. See Lahiri and Vegh (2000).
15Additionally, these assumptions imply that government foreign debt and reserves are perfect substitutes, so, a constraint
on the level of reserves is equivalent to a constraint on the level of debt.
104. Disinﬂation Program: Optimal Exchange Rate Policy
The main question of the paper is why do governments initiate a disinﬂation program even though the
ﬁscal equilibrium is not guaranteed.16 This section shows that in our framework that behavior is, indeed,
optimal.
We have simpliﬁed the model in several dimensions. First, there are no political economy issues:There
is a representative consumer (thus no distributional problems) and all agents maximize the same utility
function. Second, there are no Olivera-Tanzi eﬀects and there is no choice between inﬂation and other taxes,
which eliminates these motives as possible sources of the disinﬂation program. Finally, the central bank
is weaker than the ﬁscal authority, so no disciplinary arguments apply. This is reﬂected in the exogeneity
of gt. In summary, under these assumptions, the explanations given in the literature would imply that a
ﬂexible exchange regime is the optimal policy. If a disinﬂation is started, it is due to the tax smoothing
motive.
In this section, to isolate the adoption of the program, we solve the simple case when there are no
reserves constraints. The main result is that the optimal exchange rate path is a managed exchange rate
regime with a depreciation rate lower than the one implied by ﬂexible exchange rate.17 In later sections
we generalize the model and show that the result is still robust to most of them.
The central bank’s problem is to choose the path of nominal interest rates that solves (3.7) when
¯ r →− ∞ . First, we solve the model for a ﬂexible exchange rate as a benchmark. Second, we solve for the
optimal exchange rate policy.
4.1. Flexible exchange rate.
We deﬁne the ﬂexible exchange rate as the one that implies a constant level of reserves; thus the govern-
ment’s debt is also constant. Imposing ˙ bt =0on the government’s budget constraint we obtain,
ρb0 +gt = itmt
This equation implies that the seigniorage has to be equal to the total government expenditures every
period. Given the money demand, equation (3.2), we can solve for the interest rate, which implicitly solve
16An alternative ways of posing the same question is: why for some period of time the ﬁscal and monetary policy seems to
be inconsistent?
17A formal solution is shown in appendix A.












l ) as the interest rate in the ﬂexible regime consistent with a high (low) level of expenditure.
4.2. Optimal interest rate path
Lets show that the optimal exchange rate path before τ, is a managed exchange rate with a depreciation
rate smaller than the one implied by ﬂexible exchange rate, and that after τ,t h eo p t i m a lr e g i m ei saﬂ e x i b l e
exchange rate. The problem is solved by backward induction.
We know that, after τ, expenditure is constant in each of the states of the world. By tax smoothing,
the optimal regime is one that implies a constant inﬂationary tax. The only constant rate of depreciation
consistent withthe government’s transversality conditionis a ﬂexible exchange rate. Denote the government
















h is the interest rate consistent with the higher level of expenditure and i1
l is the one consistent
with the lower level of expenditure.
The second step is to solve for the interest rate before τ. Writing the Hamiltonian and optimizing we
obtain that the interest rate is constant prior to τ and that it satisﬁes the following constraint:
i1 =( 1− q)i1
h + qi1
l (4.4)
where i1 is the interest rate between [0,τ]. Equation (4.4) comes from equating expected marginal utilities
of consumption before and after τ. Finally, we use the law of motion of debt to compute its value at time
τ,g i v e ni1.











Equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5) constitute a system of four equations with four unknowns. The




















































Figure 4.1:Solution to the unconstrained economy.
Proposition 4.1. Along the optimal path, the exchange rate depreciation between [0,τ] is smaller than
the one implied by ﬂexible exchange rate. Moreover, foreign debt is increasing or, equivalently, reserves
are falling.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose the proposition is false, assume that i1 ≥ i
f
h. Substituting
in the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, we obtain ˙ bt < 0. T h i si sb e c a u s et h el a r g e r
interest rate implies a larger seigniorage. Thus, at time τ, the total debt is smaller than the initial debt






l . However, using equation (4.4)
the interest rate i1 is a weighted average of the interest rates after τ. In particular, it has to be always
smaller than i1
h, which is smaller than i
f
h. But this is a contradiction.
The proposition states that a disinﬂation program is initiate even though expenditure has not been
adjusted. The disinﬂation causes an increase in debt due to the reduction in seigniorage. If the ﬁscal
adjustment fails, so the bad state of the world is realized, the new equilibrium depreciation rate is higher
than the one that would prevail if a ﬂexible exchange rate were adopted in the ﬁrst place. Ex-post, it looks
as if the country made a mistake initiating the stabilization program.
The intuition of the result is the following. The announcement of the ﬁscal reform conveys good news in
terms of future expected reductions in expenditure; the expected equivalent annuity of expenditure falls.
By the intertemporal budget constraint of the government the expected equivalent annuity of taxation
13should fall too. Because inﬂation generates welfare costs the optimal path of inﬂation tax is to have a
constant expected rate of inﬂation. Thus a disinﬂation is initiated.18
Finally, note that there is no guarantee that reserves are positive in the bad state of the world. If τ
or the expected expenditure improvement are large enough, reserves can be negative, especially when the
ﬁscal adjustment does not take place. 19 We return to this point in the next section.
4.3. Discussion
There are three caveats of the model worth to be mentioned. First, the optimal exchange rate regime
is a managed exchange rate and not a ﬁxed exchange rate. Several countries, however, had ﬁxed their
exchange rates as the nominal anchor. Other reasons as visibility, credibility, or political economy have to
be introduced to explain the adoption of a pure ﬁxed exchange regime.
Second, the path of the optimal exchange rate predicted by the model does not fully characterize the
observed behavior in two important dimensions. First, the managed exchange rate predicted by the model
is a small fraction of the observed pegs. The average reduction in exchange rate depreciation is from 200
percent to almost zero. The model can explain (at most) 50 percent. Second, the model implies that if a
reform is successful, there should be a further discrete jump in the depreciation rate. In the data, excluding
some particular cases (Chile and Mexico) there is almost never a reduction in the depreciation rate after
the reform is approved. The two facts can be accounted for if inﬂation inertia (àl aCalvo) is introduced in
the model. The intuition is that the Central Bank reduces the depreciation rate below the one predicted by
fully prices in order to achieve the desired reduction in seigniorage. The Central Bank equates the beneﬁt
of reducing the inﬂation rate faster with the cost of distorting the nominal interest rate. This helps explain
the size of the disinﬂation.
In the same model, when the reform is successful (so the ﬁscal deﬁcit is permanently reduced) the
degree of inertia of the inﬂation process is reduced20. In this circumstance, there are two forces of opposite
direction that determine the optimal exchange rate policy. On the one hand, the realization of the reform
conveys good news about the future, and a smaller depreciation rate is desired. This is the direct implication
18The model has additional implications that are well in line with the existing literature on exchange rate based stabilization
programs.First, on impact, reserves go up and decrease thereafter. The reduction in the nominal interest rate implies an
increase in demand for real balances, which is reﬂected in an increase in reserves on the implementation of the disinﬂation.
Second, there is a consumption boom at the announcement of the reform. Third, the trade balance and the current account
deteriorate. See Calvo (1986 and 1987), Calvo and Vegh(1993), Agenor and Montiel (1986), Rodriguez (1982).
19The comparative statics is analyzed in the appendix. An increase in q unambiguously increases debt at τ, and reduces
current inﬂation. An increase in τ increases debt at time τ, and increases current inﬂation.
20This occurs in the Calvo model both through the expectations of future inﬂation rates and the reduction of excess domestic
demand.
14of the model developed in the previous section. On the other hand, the reduction in inﬂation inertia implies
that a less aggressive peg is required in order to achieve the same disinﬂation. Depending on the degree of
inertia the second eﬀect can dominate and therefore, no changes in the depreciation rate are going to be
observed after the reform is implemented.
The third caveat of the model is that the ﬁscal deﬁcit should increases on impact. The reduction
in inﬂation immediately reduce government revenue. In several Latin American experiences this is not
the case; the ﬁscal deﬁcit usually falls on the announcement of the reform. We know, however, that
unsustainable short term measures can be, and had been implemented to reduce these deﬁcits. In our
model, consumers have perfect foresight and only permanent changes aﬀect consumption. Consumers only
care about the equivalent annuity of government expenditure (or ﬁscal deﬁcit). To reconcile our implication
with the data it is important to look at the counter part of the ﬁscal deﬁcit, which is the path of debt:the
model, indeed implies that debt should be accumulated through out the disinﬂation program. We know
that in most of the unsuccessful cases (the only exception is Mexico 87) the government debt is increased
through out the program.21 In other words, the equivalent annuity of the ﬁscal deﬁcit increased during the
years of the disinﬂation. An alternative view to the increase in government debt is to observe a decrease
in total domestic holdings of foreign assets. In the model, the counter part of the ﬁscal deﬁcit is the
deterioration of the current account. This is a standard fact observed in exchange rate based stabilization
programs.
In summary, when the ﬁscal reform is uncertain, the announcement of it induces the Central Bank to
implement a disinﬂation program. The extent of the peg depends not only in the characteristics of the
reform process, but also on the degree of price inertia. During the disinﬂation, the economy experiences
a consumption boom, a deterioration of the current account, and an increase in government debt. If the
reform does not take place, inﬂation increases above the original level.
5. Balance of payments crisis: The Latin American case.
One of the most distinct features of the Latin American disinﬂation programs is how they end:with a
Balance of Payments crisis. As the experience has shown, these crises are costly to the economies in terms
of output losses, unemployment, and recession. In this context, we could ask whether the conclusions from
the previous section would hold in the presence of the possibility of a balance of payments crises. In fact,
a strategy that implies zero probability of facing a crisis is one in which the disinﬂation program is started
after the ﬁscal reform has been implemented.
21For example, Argentina today has 5 times the domestic debt it had in 1991.
15In this section, we explore the optimal exchange rate policy when the country faces a constraint in
the level or reserves (or equivalently in its level of debt). In this section we build heavily on the previous
literature on balance of payments crises.22 It has, however, the additional implication that a disinﬂation
program is initiated even though it implies a positive probability of facing a crises.
In the previous section, we argued that there are parameters that under the optimal policy imply
negative reserves. In these cases, if there exists a constraint on the level of reserves (assume that for
simplicity it is zero), the central bank is unable to implement the optimal unconstrained strategy. The
solution to the constrained optimization problem is then a corner solution.23 The optimal polity implies
that the central bank sets the interest rate to the minimum one that guarantees that at time τ, in any event
of the world, reserves are greater or equal than the minimum. In other words, the central bank sets the
interest rate such that in the bad state of the world reserves are zero.24 Notice that the balance of payments
crisis occurs ál aKrugman (1979) with the twist that here the timing is given and not the ﬁscal deﬁcit.
In Krugman’s model, the engine of the crisis is an exogenous ﬁscal deﬁcit. Thus, the timing is determined
by the necessity to ﬁnance the deﬁcit with reserves. In our case, the expenditure process is exogenous, but
not the ﬁscal deﬁcit. The timing of the crisis is given by the realization of not implementing the reform,
and the inﬂation tax revenue (or equivalently the ﬁscal deﬁcit) adjusts to make the crisis rational at τ.I n
other words, the inﬂation tax is such that there is a ﬁscal deﬁcit ﬁnanced by reserves that makes optimal
a speculative attack at τ.
Assume the constraint is hit, we know that after τ reserves are zero in the bad state; therefore by the
balance sheet of the central bank, domestic debt and money holdings are equal.





h stands for the interest rate when the level of expenditure is high and there is a constraint on the
level of reserves. The interest rate after τ also has to satisfy the transversality condition on the government




(y +ρa0 −gh) (5.1)
The interest rate prior to τ has to be consistent with a debt accumulation such that debt is equal to
e q u a t i o n( 5 . 1 )a tt i m eτ. Using the equation for debt accumulation we solve for the interest rate (ic)p r i o r
22See Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1986), Calvo (1986 and 1987).
23The formal solution is in appendix B.
24When expenditure is not adjusted interest rates increase and reserves fall. Thus, if the constraint is binding it has to be


















Proposition 5.1. The optimal path implies that a disinﬂation program is initiated at the announcement
of the ﬁscal reform. Most importantly, there is a positive probability of a balance of payments crisis.
Proof. i1 implies an accumulation of debt that generates negative reserves, and we constructed ic to have
a lower rate of debt accumulation. Thus, ic >i 1 by construction. To show that if >i c we follow the same
proof by contradiction of proposition (4.1), or by inspection of equation (5.2).
Finally, the interest rate is computed such that the reserves reach their minimum in the case of not
adjusting the expenditure. This means, that there is a balance of payments crisis at τ that occurs with
probability equal to the probability that the bad state of the world is realized. In other words, when it is
known that the ﬁscal reform has failed there is a speculative attack.
Note that the proposition implies that a government initiates a disinﬂation program even though there
is a risk of a balance of payments crisis.25 The intuition is that the announcement of the ﬁscal reform
conveys good news in the future and the government wants to transfer part of those future beneﬁts to
today in the form of higher real balances. The extent in which this transfer can be made is limited by the
debt constraint. Therefore there is no full smoothing of consumption and money holdings. It is always
optimal, however, to transfer some of those beneﬁts to today.
Two remarks about the cost of a balance of payments crises:First, in this model, the only cost of the
b a l a n c eo fp a y m e n t sc r i s i si st h ee l i m i n a t i o no fr e s e r v e sa n dt h el a c ko ff o r e i g nc r e d i t ;t h i si st h eS a r g e n t
& Wallace eﬀect. Balance of payments crises, however, are likely to be more costly than this. Considering
additional costs does not change the qualitative implications of the model.
In particular, the proposition (almost) continues to be true if additional costs have to be paid after the
crisis occurs. The intuition is that the crisis is avoided with probability one if the interest rate implemented
is an ε larger than ic. Thus, in the case in which the costs of the balance of payments crisis are paid after
the speculative attack, the model predicts the same timing for the initiation of the disinﬂation program,
and a similar depreciation rate.
Second, a more realistic cost of the balance of payment would assume that the interest rate faced by
the government is a decreasing (convex and diﬀerentiable) function of the level of reserves. The disinﬂation
25This result is robust to alternative formulations of preferences and expenditure processes.
17will be initiated at the announcement of the reform, but the size of the disinﬂation would be smaller. There
is a marginal beneﬁt of reserves on top of its ﬁnancing role that limits the extent of the depreciation.
In summary, we show that the nature of the solution does not change if a maximum level of debt exists.
Still it is the case that the government initiates a disinﬂation program when a ﬁscal reform is announced.
The important result is that the optimal policy implies that there exists a positive probability of a balance
of payments crisis. Notice that this does not mean that a balance of payments crisis is optimal. Rather it
means that it is optimal to initiate a disinﬂation program even if there exists a probability of a balance of
payments crisis.
6. Sequence of Stabilization Programs.
In ﬁgure 6.1, the Brazilian monthly inﬂation rate in the late 80’s is plotted. The shaded area represents
periods where disinﬂation programs where in place.26 There are two facts that we can extract from this
ﬁgure. First, notice that there is a sequence of unsuccessful stabilization programs. Second, that every
time the program fails, the inﬂation rate is higher than the inﬂation before the program was initiated.
This experience is not exclusively Brazilian. For example, Venezuela since 1983 had implemented ﬁve
stabilization programs, and Argentina did the same in the 70’s.
In this section, we show that this pattern is the optimal policy. We show that the central bank
implements a sequence of stabilization programs, even though each time it is harder to reduce inﬂation
and it is more costly if the program fails.
To capture this dynamics we change our basic framework and assume that the government is continu-
ously trying to reduce expenditure:every time a ﬁscal reform fails, the government announces a new one.
This behavior should raise naturally from the assumption that expenditure is wasteful. A very simple way
of modelling this is to assume that expenditure follows a Poisson process, which implies that there is a
26In the particular case of Brazil, several of those cases involve price controls.
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Figure 6.1:Stabilization programs and monthly inﬂation:Brazil.
ﬁscal reform at every point in time with probability qdt of being successful.27
gt+dt =

    
    
gh w/p 1 −qdt if gt = gh
gl w/p qdt
gl w/p 1i f gt = gl
Deﬁne the high state when there is a high level of expenditure, and the low state when there is a low
level of expenditure. The rest of the section is organized as follows:First, we solve the problem assuming
no debt constraints. We show that the optimal policy implies a continuum of disinﬂation programs (thus a
sequence of them). Second, we introduce a reserve constraint and show that, even though there exists the
possibility of a balance of payments crisis, the optimal strategy is to implement a sequence of disinﬂation
programs until one is successful. Finally, we introduce the possibility of foreign help (in the form of IMF
and World Bank loans) and show that this implies that after a loan is made, the government implements
a disinﬂation program until the balance of payments reappears.
27There are two ways in which this process can be interpreted. First, at every time t the government announces a ﬁscal
reform for time t+dt. If it fails, then the government announces a new one. Second, there is only one permanent ﬁscal reform,
but the government is uncertain about when it is going to succeed. Thus, this section might also be interpreted as a relaxation
of the expenditure process assumed earlier where the timing is exogenous.
196.1. Unconstrained economy.
The ﬁrst result is that the optimal policy is to implement a continuum of disinﬂation programs. This is
shown by proving that when expenditure is high, the optimal nominal interest rate is always smaller than
the one implied by ﬂexible exchange rate. To solve the problem we deﬁne a value function in each of the
states of the world.
ρV l (bt)=m a x
θt
￿




ρV h (bt)=m a x
θt
￿
lnθt +[ρbt + gh −(y +ρa0)(1− θt)]V h
b + q
￿
V l − V h
￿￿
where V l is the value function when expenditure is low and V h is the value function when expenditure is
high.28
Proposition 6.1. If expenditure is high, the optimal strategy involves a rate of depreciation smaller than
the one implied by ﬂexible exchange rate, inﬂation and government debt are increasing every unsuccessful
ﬁscal reforms, and the optimal strategy approaches the ﬂexible exchange rate at high levels of debt.
If expenditure is low, the optimal strategy is either a ﬂexible or a ﬁxed exchange regime. This is because
the optimal ﬂexible regime is a constant exchange rate.
Proof. The proof is in appendix C see propositions C.1 and C.2.
The proposition implies that the optimal strategy when expenditure is high, is a managed exchange
rate regime. Additionally, it implies that the larger the level of debt, the smaller the disinﬂation eﬀort. In
other words, the diﬀerence in the nominal interest rate between the optimal and the implied by ﬂexible
exchange rate is a decreasing function of debt.
The diﬀerential equations implied by equation 6.1 do not have a close form solution, thus we solve
them numerically. The solutions for the optimal policy when expenditure is high is shown in ﬁgure 6.2.
Debt as a percentage of GDP is measured in the x-axis, il is the interest rate implied by ﬂexible exchange
rate when expenditure is low (the bottom schedule), if is the interest rate implied by ﬂexible exchange
rate when expenditure is high (the top schedule), and ih is the solution of the diﬀerential equation when
expenditure is high. The interest rate is increasing with debt and is always smaller than the interest rate
implied by ﬂexible exchange rate in the high state.
















































interest rate low expenditure
interest rate high expenditure
interest rate (flexible) high expenditure
interest rate, constrained case, high expenditure
Figure 6.2:Solution to the poisson process.
6.2. Debt Constraint
We now introduce the possibility of a balance of payments crisis. Similarly as in the previous section, the
maximum level of debt is given by equation (5.1). At this level of debt the optimal strategy is a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime; thus we use this constraint as a boundary condition for the diﬀerential equation.
After substituting by the FOC, the diﬀerential equation is,
￿
















gh + ρ¯ b





(y + ρa0 −gh)
The solution is shown in ﬁgure 6.2, where the interest rate of the constrained economy is computed.
Note that for low levels of debt, the solutions for the constrained and unconstrained economy are similar.
On the other hand, when debt is increasing the constrained economy approaches the ﬂexible exchange rate
faster than the unconstrained economy. Finally, when the maximum level of debt is reached, the regime
changes to a ﬂexible exchange rate in the constrained economy. In other words, when reserves are zero
there are no possibilities of ﬁnancing a reduction in inﬂation, other than implementing the ﬁscal reform.
216.3. Foreign Help
In this section, we show that if the country is close to hit the debt constraint a foreign loan is welfare
improving and it implies an immediate adoption of a disinﬂation program. To clarify the intuition, assume
that the economy has reached the maximum level of debt, so it has a ﬂexible exchange rate. Lets interpret
the debt level net of foreign help. This means that a loan from the IMF or the World Bank increases the
debt capacity of the country. In terms of our model, the economy jumps to the left in ﬁgure 6.2. Therefore,
a more aggressive disinﬂation program is initiated, real balances increase, and the consumer’s utility goes
up.
In summary, the results in this section are the following:First, the optimal strategy implies a sequence
of disinﬂation programs even though there exists the possibility of a balance of payments crisis. Second,
the inﬂation rate is increasing through the path every time the disinﬂation program fails. Third, the larger
the debt, the smaller the disinﬂation eﬀort. In other words, the “harder” the disinﬂation is.
7. Conclusions
Several Latin American countries have initiated stabilization programs based on ﬁscal reforms and on
exchange rate managements. In most of these cases, the program was abandoned, and ex-post,i ts e e m e d
as if it was a bad idea to initiate it in the ﬁrst place. This paper has shown that if inﬂation has convex
welfare costs and the ﬁscal reform is uncertain, it is possible to explain the government’s behavior.
The paper shows why a government would implement a disinﬂation program even though the ﬁscal
support has not come. The results show that the timing of the disinﬂation is unaﬀected even though
there exists a possibility of a balance of payments crisis. Additionally, the analysis implies that countries
will implement a sequence of disinﬂation programs until one of them is successful, or until a balance of
payments crisis occurs. Each failed stabilization increases the inﬂation rate and makes the next disinﬂation
program tougher to implement.
We show that these results are robust to several speciﬁcations of the expenditure process. Moreover,
similar results can be obtained in more general models with alternative utility functions and speciﬁcations
of money demand (for example, money in the utility function).
The two most important caveats of the model, however, are its inability to explain the size of the
disinﬂation program and the oversimpliﬁcation of the costs of failed stabilization programs. As was dis-
cussed in section 4.3, the ﬁrst problem can be solved if inﬂation inertia is introduced in the model (Calvo
(1983)). In that case, inﬂation is a smooth process and the exchange rate disinﬂation overshoots in order
22to help inﬂation to come down. Moreover, that model is also able to explain the process of inﬂation after
the reform is approved. Even though such model could be more realistic, the inclusion of price stickiness
complicates the analysis without providing additional intuition of the reasons that explain the initiation
of the disinﬂation. In fact, the timing is unaﬀected by considering sticky prices.
The second problem of the model is that the only cost of the disinﬂation program is the Sargent &
Wallace eﬀect, which is likely to be small. In reality, disinﬂation programs are more costly than just its
impact on future ﬁnancing (especially when they fail). As was argued before, the model can be extended
in this direction. The conjecture is that the qualitative results remain the same, and the timing of the
disinﬂation is unaﬀected by these issues.
Finally, three important dimensions of stabilization programs have not been considered in the paper
and should be the subject of future research:First, we have not considered political economy and credibility
issues to explain the adoption of these reforms. These are important aspects and a more complete story
should include them. The consideration of the political economy reasons and the tax smoothing motive
in the adoption of the program are aspects that should be further investigated in order to improve our
understanding of the disinﬂation experiences.
Second, almost all countries experienced an increase in real interest rate on the implementation of the
program. In our model, the real interest rate is constant because we assumed that government debt is
indexed. Credibility and imperfect capital mobility could explain the path of the real interest rate. First,
if credibility is associated with the process of reform, then risk premium can explain the changes in the real
interest rate (see Velasco (1993)). Second, if the capital account is closed, and the government is involved
in a tight monetary policy, the interest rate on impact might increase (see Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart
(1993)).
Third, in the model presented, the government and the supply side (the reform process) have been
oversimpliﬁed. In future research, the process of the ﬁscal reform should be endogenized in order to
understand its interaction with the disinﬂation, its timing and size.
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27A. The basic model
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw es o l v et h es i m p l em o d e lp r e s e n t e di nt h et e x t .
A.1. Consumer’s problem

















where the ﬁrst equation is the objective function. The second equation is the intertemporal budget con-
straint in terms of tradables. The third equation is the cash in advance constraint. And the fourth equation
















= y + ρa0
Note that the consumer’s consumption and money function does not depend on the future path of interest
rates. This result comes from the log utility assumption.
A.2. Central Bank’s problem
We derive the solution in two steps. First we solve the problem when there is no ﬁscal uncertainty and
expenditure is constant. Second, we solve the problem with the stochastic process assumed in the text.
Solution without ﬁscal uncertainty. We show that the solution when there is no risk in government


























The ﬁrst order conditions are,
1
θt





λt =0 ,t h e n
.
θt =0 . This means that the multiplier is constant and that marginal consumption
is constant. Which means that the optimal strategy for the government is to have a constant inﬂation;
smooth the inﬂationary tax. To determine the level of the multiplier we substitute in the budget constraint




This means that the solution is a constant depreciation rate equal to the ﬂexible exchange rate.
Fiscal uncertainty. We solve the problem by backward induction. Given that we know that without
ﬁscal uncertainty the solution is a constant interest rate, then after τ, there should be a constant inﬂation
rate consistent with a ﬂexible exchange rate given the level of debt at τ. Formally,
θ1








h is the inverse of the interest rate when the level of expenditure is high, and θ1
l is the inverse of
the interest rate when the level of expenditure is low. Substituting in the utility function and using the

























writing the Hamiltonian and solving the ﬁrst order conditions we ﬁnd (as before) that the optimal interest
rate has to be constant between [0,τ]. Using the debt accumulation equation and substituting in the










This condition is saying that marginal utility of consumption before τ is equal to the expected marginal
utility of consumption after τ. Which is the usual Euler condition on consumption. Substituting by the
deﬁnitions of θ we obtain the equation (4.4) in the text for the interest rate.













i1 =( 1 − q)i1
h + qi1
l










Solving implicitly for the debt level and the interest rate, it can be shown that i1 is smaller that the pure
ﬂexible exchange rate. This means that a managed exchange rate has been initiated with the announcement
of the ﬁscal reform. Second, it can be also shown that there is an increase in debt, meaning that the
disinﬂation program is ﬁnanced either by reserves or foreign debt.
B. Model with debt constraint.
In this section we solve the problem when there is a constraint in the level of reserves or, equivalently,
a constraint in the level of debt. For simplicity assume that reserves have to be positive. The problem
is solved in two steps:First, we deﬁne the level of debt constraint. Second, we solve the Kuhn-Tucker
problem.
We know that when the constraint is hit the expenditure is high. At that moment, money demand and
total debt are equal. Moreover, the interest rate has to be one in which there is no change in the level of















(y +ρa0 −gh) (B.1)
Thus, if the constraint is binding, then the interest rate between [0,τ] has to be one such that the debt
accumulated until time τ is equal to equation (B.1). Using the government’s debt law of motion, we solve
for the interest rate,
θc ≡ 1+Ψ τ
￿
αρ −




















θt ≤ θc for all t [0,τ]
where the last constraint implies that the nominal interest has to be always larger or equal to ic otherwise,
the constraint on the level of reserves would be hit. Writing the Hamiltonian we solve the Kuhn-Tucker
problem. If the constraint is not binding then the solution is the same as the previous section. If the















y+ρa0 gt = gl τ ≥ 0
where bc
τ is given by equation (B.1) and θc is given by equation (B.2). Notice that by construction bc
τ is




l , but it
is positive which implies that there is a disinﬂation program before τ. In other words, even though there
exists the possibility of a balance of payments crisis, still it is optimal to initiate a disinﬂation program
ﬁnanced with reserves.
C. Expenditure follows a Poisson process
In this section we assume that the expenditure follows a Poisson process. First we solve the problem
without reserves constraints. Second, we show the solution when there are reserves constraints.
C.1. No reserves constraint





gh w/p 1 −qdt if gt = gh
gl w/p qdt
gl w/p 1i f gt = gl
In this case, we have two value functions. One for the low level of expenditure and one for the high level
of expenditure. The Bellman’s equations are,
ρV l (bt)=m a x
θt
￿
lnθt +[ρbt + gl − (y + ρa0)(1−θt)]V l
b
￿
ρV h (bt)=m a x
θt
￿
lnθt +[ρbt + gh −(y +ρa0)(1− θt)]V h
b + q
￿
V l − V h
￿￿





+(y + ρa0)V l
b =0 (C.1)
￿












Substituting in the Bellman equation it is possible to solve for the value function. Notice that the value
function is twice diﬀerentiable, decreasing and concave, and the interest rate policy function is increasing
and convex. Now, we solve the problem for the value function with high level of expenditure. The ﬁrst




+( y + ρa0)V h
b =0 (C.3)
￿













Proposition C.1. ∀bt < ∞⇒θh (bt) <θ l (bt)
Proof. Lets ﬁrst show that they can not be equal, and then show that θh (bt) can not be larger than
θl (bt).A s s u m eθh (bt)=θl (bt). Then equations (C.1) and (C.3) imply that, V l
b = V h
b . Substituting in the
right hand side of equation (C.4) we obtain,
￿










￿= θl (bt) ∀ bt < ∞
which is a contradiction for any ﬁnite level of debt.










=( y + ρa0)V l
b ⇒ V h
b >Vl
b
This implies that the right hand side of equation (C.4) is always positive. Given the properties of the value
function we know that V h
bb is negative. Thus this would imply that the term in the brackets is negative.
￿
ρbt +gh − (y + ρa0)
￿
1 − θh (bt)
￿￿
< 0
Solving for θh (bt)




which is a contradiction. Therefore, θh (bt) <θ l (bt) for any ﬁnite level of debt.
32Note that this proposition implies also, that V h
b <Vl
b. Thus the right hand side of equation (C.4) is
negative. Now lets show that the optimal solution implies a disinﬂation program when expenditure is high.
Proposition C.2. ∀bt < ∞⇒θh (bt) >θ f (bt)
Proof. Remember that we deﬁne θf (bt) as the solution to
￿
ρbt + gh −(y + ρa0)
￿
1 − θf (bt)
￿￿
=0








ρbt +gh − (y + ρa0)
￿
1 − θh (bt)
￿￿
> 0
Therefore, the optimal path implies a reduction in reserves (increasing debt) and θh (bt) >θ f (bt) for any
ﬁnite level of debt.
Substituting the deﬁnitions of θ and the value functions, we obtain the following diﬀerential equation
for the interest rate when expenditure is high.
￿

















if =l i m
b→−∞





The solution is shown in ﬁgure 6.2. The schedule in the bottom is the interest rate when there is a
low level of expenditure. The schedule on the top is the interest rate implied by a ﬂexible exchange rate
when expenditure is high. The schedule in the middle is the solution for the diﬀerential equation when
expenditure is high.
C.2. Reserves constraint
In this section we assume that reserves have to be positive. This imposes a limit on the maximum level of




(y +ρa0 − gh)
the solution for the constrained economy implies the same diﬀerential equation as before but with a diﬀerent
boundary condition. Formally,
￿
















gh + ρ¯ b





(y + ρa0 −gh)
The properties of the solution are conserved. The numerical solutions is shown in ﬁgure 6.2. We compare
the solution for the constrained and unconstrained economies. Notice that for low levels of debt the two
33solutions behave similarly. However, when the crisis is close the interest rate starts increasing faster in the
constrained case.
D. Expenditure follows a Jump Diﬀusion Process
In the paper we solve the optimal interest rate when the process follows a particular case of a Poisson
process. In this section we ﬁnd the solution for a more general stochastic process. The process assumed in
the text has two characteristics:First, its drift is negative. Second, the timing of the change is known. In
this section we analyze under which conditions a disinﬂation program is initiated.
Assume that the expenditure follows,
dgt = µgdt +σgdzt +λgdq
where dzt is the standard Weiner process, and dq is a Poisson process that takes value 0 with probability
1 −qdt,a n dv a l u e1 with probability qdt.T h eB e l l m a n ’ se q u a t i o ni nc o n t i n u o u st i m ei s ,
ρV (bt,g t)=m a x
θt
{lnθt +EdV}
Using Itô’s lemma we can show that,

















Notice that the value function has the following properties. First, it is continuous and twice diﬀerentiable.
Second, it is decreasing with respect to debt and government expenditure. Notice that this implies that
the policy function (θt)i sn o n - i n c r e a s i n gw i t hd e b ta n de x p e n d i t u r e .F i n a l l y ,V is concave with respect to
its arguments.
T h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e mi m p l i e s ,





+q[Vb (·,g t + λg) −Vb]
























− q[i(bt,g t + λg) −i(bt,g t)]
This is a delayed partial diﬀerential equation, and it does not have a close form solution. However, we
are more interested in its characterization. In this case, it is important to understand when the interest
rate implied by this equation is smaller than the interest rate from ﬂexible exchange rate. In other words,
what are the conditions on the stochastic process that generates a managed exchange rate with a loss in
reserves.












Figure D.1:Determination of the region where the optimal interest rate coincides with the ﬂexible exchange
rate.
the right hand side of equation D.2 to be equal to zero. The ﬁrst term in the left hand side is always is





i st h eo p p o s i t es i g no ft h er i g h th a n ds i d e .












− q[it(·,g t + λg) −it] < 0
Notice that this is an equilibrium condition, which makes it very diﬃcult to characterize. Using numerical
methods we can ﬁnd the required drift to satisfy the condition, given certain level of uncertainty. We solve
the problem for the case q =0and ﬁnd the set of points
￿
µ,σ2￿
such that the solution for the diﬀerential
equation implies a ﬂexible exchange rate. The solution is shown in ﬁgure D.1.
Note that a negative drift is necessary (but not suﬃcient). In other words, there has to be a reform in
place otherwise there is no rationale for a disinﬂation program. The negative drift can be obtain either by
the Brownian motion part, or the Poisson process.
D.1. Solution when there is a debt constraint.





(y + ρa0 − gt)
Moreover, we know that at that level of debt the interest rate is given by the ﬂexible exchange rate one.
We use this as a boundary condition for the partial diﬀerential equation.
The solution for the partial diﬀerential equation are shown in ﬁgure D.2 and D.3. Figure D.2 is the
solution for the unconstrained economy, and ﬁgure D.3 is the solution for the constrained economy. As






























































































































































































































































Figure D.3:Solution to the brownian motion case. Constrained economy.
36E. Solution for the Money in the Utility model.
In this section we show that the main result of the paper can be obtained in a Money in the utility model.
The two most important results in the model are:First, the tax smoothing result that implies that optimal
interest rates are constant if government expenditure is constant. Second, that expected marginal utilities
are equalized at the time of reform.






U (ct,m t) e−ρtdt
s.t.
.




The ﬁrst order conditions are
Uc = λt (E.1)
Um = itλt (E.2)
˙ λt =0 (E.3)
.
at = ρat + y −ct −itmt (E.4)
This implies that consumption is constant and that the total inﬂationary taxes paid satisfy
Uc = λ0




Now assume the expenditure is constant, andlets show that the optimal solutionis to have consumption,
monetary holdings, and interest rate constant. The Central Bank maximizes the same utility function as







U (ct,m t) e−ρtdt
s.t.
.
bt = ρbt +g −itmt





H = U (ct,m t)+µt(ρbt + g −itmt)















bt = ρbt + g − itmt
Using the government budget constraint we can show that the net present value of total expenditures has





Which implies that the total consumption is constant and equal to
c0 = y + ρa0 − (g +ρb0) (E.5)
Note that equation (E.5) implies that consumption is independent of the path of taxes. This is because
in this model there is Ricardian Equivalence. If the taxes are reduced today, those will have to be recovered
in the future. This implies that ∂ct
∂it = 0.


















Therefore, if the demand for real balances is well behaved (monotonic) the optimal solution for the
central bank is to have a constant elasticity of substitution on the money holdings. For example, in a CES
this implies a unique money demand for each level of consumption. Given that the level of consumption
is unique due to equation (E.5), this implies that the interest rate is constant too. This proves the ﬁrst
part of the results. If expenditure is constant, and the utility function is well behaved (decreasing and
monotonic demand functions) the optimal monetqary policy is to set a constant tax.
From the budget constraint of the government debt it is easy to show that the solution implies that
itmt = g +ρb0
The second result comes directly from the concavity of the utility function. The optimal monetary
policy will equate the expected utility before and after the resolution of the uncertainty takes place. The
reason is that otherwise there will be a jump in the exchange rate that would have been anticipated. In
order to avoid it, the expected utility after τ and the marginal utility before τ are the same.
Given some assumptions on the utility function we can obtain that increases in expenditure need
increases in interest rate to compensate the extra resources. This implies that after τ if the ﬁscal reform
is successful there is a decrease in the interest rate. Thus, the interest rate before τ has to be a weighted
average of the interest rate assuming there is a high or low expenditure. Because in our set up, the high
expenditure after τ is the same as that one that exists at time t =0 , this implies that the interest rate
between 0 and τ i ss m a l l e rt h a nt h eo n et h a te x i s t sb e f o r et =0s m a l l e rt h a nt h eo n et h a te x i s t sa f t e rτ if
the reform is unsuccessful, but bigger than the one that will prevail if the reform is successful.
38E.1. Solution for a CES






















But consumption is given by equation (E.5)
ct = y +ρa0 −(g + ρb0)
a n dg i v e nt h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n to ft h eg o v e r n m e n tw eh a v et h a t
























Note that in equation (E.6) and (E.7) an increase in government expenditure increases the interest
rate (decrasing money holdings) if φ>2 which implies an elasticity of substitution between money and
consumption smaller than 1/2. Under that assumption the results from the paper are all replicated in this
set up.
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